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INTRODUCTION 
The statement of facts offered in respondents' brief 
requires response because it is encumbered by both inaccurate and 
irrelevant details. Throughout the course of these proceedings 
the defendants have attempted to divert the focus of this action 
away from the legal questions presented. They seek to focus on 
Mr. Swayne's relationship with the child's mother, instead of his 
relationship with the child, in the hope that the Court will 
share their moral judgment that Mr. SWayne's refusal to marry the 
mother somehow disqualifies him from having any parental rights. 
This attempt is pointless. The illegitimacy of the child is the 
starting point of the legal analysis in this case. It is settled 
and beyond dispute that the father of an illegitimate child has 
constitutionally protected parental rights; whether the defen-
dants would have it be so is of no significance. The issue 
presented here whether those unquestioned rights were terminated 
in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. 
The defendantsf statement of facts also distorts the 
record with regard to the relevant events which preceded and 
followed the release of the child by her mother. Penny never 
discussed with Steven the "possibility of placing the baby for 
adoption". (Respondents' brief at 4)i. She informed him that hei 
parents wanted her to place the child for adoption. In response 
to this information Steven "said that I shouldn't let them talk 
me into anything, that it should be my decision, that if I didn't 
want the baby, I could give it to hirrt" (Tr. at 10). 
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Ms. Paxmanfs dealings with L.D.S. Social Services were 
at the behest of her parents. Her decision to release the child 
for adoption on June 8 was, in her words on the stand and not in 
defense counsel's as set forth in an affidavit, based upon the 
following considerations: 
Because at that point in time, I felt that I 
was not emotionally stable enough to care for 
a baby. My parents had told me that I could 
have no contact with my family if I kept the 
baby, and I was also worried about what 
support I'd receive from Steven, not so much 
financially but emotionally. I guess at that 
time I felt that they would take the pressure 
off of me that my parents were putting on me, 
and that's the thing that I should do such 
when I signed the papers. 
(Tr. at 37). 
L.D.S. Social Services' representative, Elda Bowen, 
"counseled" Ms. Paxman about the experiences of another white 
woman who had kept a "mixed" child and explained how the black 
father in that case had failed to fulfill his responsibilities. 
(Tr., Vol. II, at 6-7). She also urged Ms. Paxman to sign the 
release forms for the child on June 8, even though she was going 
to keep the baby through the next day "so Steven wouldn't have an 
opportunity to file his paternity." (Tr., Vol. II, at 7-8). 
Prior to signing this release Penny had informed Ms. Bowen that 
Steven "had been involved throughout the pregnancy" and "had been 
there at the hospital". (Tr. at 35). 
These events happened on June 8, after Ms. Paxman and 
the child had visited Steven in his apartment. While the defen-
dants now deny that this visit is evidenced in the record (after 
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previously stipulating to it in Federal court), it is described 
by Mr* Swayne in his deposition, which defendants made part of 
the record in the Court below. (Swayne depo. at 44-45). The 
next day, when Ms. Paxman returned with the child "so he could 
see the baby one last time" (Respondents' brief at 7), Steven had 
no idea of, and was not told of, the proposed adoption (Tr. at 
16). Ms. Paxman then left for California. Contrary to incorrect 
assertion of defendants that Ms. Paxman only made two subsequent 
contacts with Steven (Respondents' brief at 7), she testified 
that she called him from Las Vegas on|the way and after getting 
to San Diego "I called three more times from there, and then all 
three times I let on that I still had the baby." (Tr. at 16). 
She then called his family and said the baby was dead. 
Two other misstatements in the respondents' brief 
deserve mention because they have recurred throughout these 
proceedings even though they are not supported by the evidence. 
The defendants assert that Mr. Swayne "refused" to sign an 
acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital. The testimony, 
however, is that he did not "refuse" to sign the paper, but it 
simply didn't get done before Ms. Pa^ iman's mother checked her oul 
of the hospital (Tr. at 11-12). Furthermore, the assertion that 
hospital personnel explained to Ms. Paxman that Mr. Swayne could 
not have his name placed on the birthj certificate unless he 
signed "an Acknowledgment of Paternity form, supplied by the 
hospital, signifying his 'willingness and intent to support [the 
child to the best of [his] ability'" (Respondents' brief at 5-6) 
- 3 -
is a product only of the defendants' imagination. Ms. Paxman 
testified that the 
hospital clerk came in to fill out the birth 
certificate, and when she came to the section 
for the father's name she recognized that we 
were not married, and she said at that time 
we had to go down to the office in the 
hospital and have him fill out a paternity 
form in front of a notary public. But it was 
just described to me as a form to have his 
name put on the birth certificate. She did 
not describe that it was a form that he was 
claiming he was the father. 
(Tr. at 11) 
Q. It was your testimony, wasn't it, that a 
nurse came in and was helping fill out 
some hospital information regarding the 
birth certificate and at that time found 
out that you were not married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she explained to you at that time 
that there was something that the father 
needed to sign? 
A. She explained it as it was a form to 
have the name put on the birth certifi-
cate. That was the only way it was 
explained to me. 
Q. Did she say that it had to be signed in 
order to have his name put on the birth 
certificate? 
A. Yes, she did. 
Q. It had to be signed where, did she say? 
A. Had to be signed in front of a notary 
public, and she said that they had one 
there in the hospital but only until 
later that night. 
(Tr. at 32) 
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The defendants assert a "refusal" which doesn't exist 
in an effort to imply that Mr. Swayne consciously disregarded a 
known obligation to sign the form or forfeit his parental rights. 
The evidence is entirely contrary (Tr., Vol. II, at 11). In 
fact, in the Federal action the defendants stipulated to Mr. 
Swaynefs ignorance of the filing requirement. See Swayne v. 
L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537, 1539 (D. Utah 1987). 
Whether or not defendants feel bound by prior stipulations, the 
uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Swayne had no knowledge of 
the filing requirement and the defendants' after the fact effort 
to imply that it was explained to him in the hospital is simply 
not supported by the evidence and is 4 conscious attempt to 
mislead this Court. 
Additionally, the defendants have repeatedly asserted 
that Mr. Swayne intends to "give" his child to his sister. 
(Respondents' brief at 8, 26). While there is no question Steven 
has discussed with his sister and brother-in-law ways in which 
they may help him raise the child, Mr. Swayne testified unequivo-
cally that he wants custody of the child (Tr., Vol. II at 27). 
Furthermore, the fact that he might temporarily place some of the 
responsibility for raising the child in family members is per-
fectly consistent with the exercise of his parental rights. It 
is so fundamental that Utah law expressly recognizes the right oi 
parents to make temporary delegations of their parental rights. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-5-103 (Rep. Vol. 8A 1978) 
- 5 -
Indeed, the rights of a parent to call upon the assis-
tance of his extended family in raising his child is one which is 
of constitutional significance. Although the defendants seem to 
believe that Mr. Swayne should be held up to ridicule for seeking 
familial assistance in raising his daughter, the United States 
Supreme Court has noted that the 
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and 
especially grandparents sharing a household 
along with parents and children has roots 
equally venerable and deserving of constitu-
tional recognition [as those of the nuclear 
family]. Over the years millions of our 
citizens have grown up in just such an 
environment, and most, surely, have profited 
from it. Even if the condition of modern 
society have brought about a decline in 
extended family households, they have not 
erased the accumulated wisdom of civiliza-
tion, gained over the centuries and honored 
throughout our history, that supports a 
larger conception of the family. Out of 
choice, necessity, or a sense of family 
responsibility, it has been common for close 
relatives to draw together and participate in 
the duties and satisfactions of a common 
home. Decisions concerning child rearing, 
which Yoder, Mayer, Pierce and other cases 
have recognized as entitled to constitutional 
protection, long have been shared with 
grandparents or other relatives who occupy 
the same household - indeed who may take on 
major responsibility for the rearing of the 
children. Especially in times of adversity, 
such as the death of a spouse or economic 
need, the broader family has tended to come 
together for mutual sustenance and to main-
tain or rebuild a secure home life. . . . 
Whether or not such a household is estab-
lished because of personal tragedy, the 
choice of relatives in this degree of kinship 
to live together may not lightly be denied by 
the State . . . . the Constitution prevents 
[the State] from standardizing its children -
and its adults - by forcing all to live in 
certain narrowly defined family patterns. 
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U,S. 494, 504-506 (1977). 
Despite the defendants1 apparent belief that only two 
parent nuclear family homes are suitable for child rearing, the 
Constitution will not tolerate effort^ to impose "suburbia1s 
preference in patterns of family living.ff Matter of Adoption of 
Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J., 
dissenting). 
The defendants repeated efforts to color the evidence 
in a manner which they believe calls Mr. Swaynefs parental 
fitness into question highlights the constitutional infirmity of 
the statutory scheme under consideration because, despite the 
defendants' incessant moralizing about Mr. Swaynefs lifestyle, 
the statute absolutely forbids a Court from permitting Mr. Swayne 
an opportunity to present evidence of his fitness. Fitness is 
nowhere mentioned in the statute with which this action is 
concerned and it is Mr. Swayne who is asserting that it must be, 
not L.D.S. Social Services. 
While the plaintiff has consistently tried to minimize 
references to the racial and religious bigotry which caused his 
daughter to be surrendered by her mother, because the constitu-
tional issues requiring analysis do not concern those facts, the 
defendants have adamantly refused to limit their presentation to 
the relevant facts. This failure is, no doubt, due to the 
perceived weakness of their legal arguments. When choosing the 
evidence to marshall to "document11 why Mr. Swayne isn't a "carinc 
and involved" father, the defendants begin by reciting that he is 
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a 22-year-old single black man who lives in an apartment (Respon-
dents' brief at 2-3). While plaintiff has no doubt that the 
relevance of these facts on the question of fitness seemed 
manifest to the author of respondent's brief, plaintiff is 
equally confident that this court will decide the issue presented 
on the basis of appropriate considerations. 
It was Steven Swayne, and his family, who held a baby 
shower to celebrate the birth of this child; it was Steven 
Swayne, and his family, who attended at birth and visited in the 
hospital; it was Steven Swayne, and his family, who proposed to 
raise and care for this child; and it is Steven Swayne who is 
still doing everything in his power to obtain custody of his 
daughter. It was Ms. Paxman who abandoned this child because of 
pressure from her parents, who hold the view that blacks and 
whites are racially incompatible (Respondents1 brief at 4). The 
question presented is whether or not Utah's statutory scheme, 
which purports to honor Ms. Paxman's wishes and frustrate Mr. 
Swayne's, is constitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I AS ONLY THE STATE CAN TERMINATE 
PARENTAL RIGHTS, A STATUTE WHICH 
PURPORTS TO GRANT PRIVATE PERSONS 
THE POWER TO TERMINATE A PARENT'S 
RIGHTS ALSO MAKES THE CONDUCT OF 
SUCH INDIVIDUALS STATE ACTION 
The defendants' contention that this case involves no 
state action was exhaustively addressed and rejected by Judge 
Greene. His opinion in Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 
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exclusive prerogative of 
F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah), is a compelling response to this argument 
and is appended to this brief for the convenience of the Court. 
The only additional response required is to note that 
the defendants1 assertion that adoption isn't the exclusive 
prerogative of the state misses the wl^ ole point in issue. The 
termination of parental rights .is the 
the state. This is not an adoption case, it is a challenge to 
the statutorily mandated termination of the parental rights of 
Steven Swayne which occurred when L.D.S. Social Services took 
custody of his daughter. 
POINT II TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PARENTAL 
RIGHTS WOULD BE A DENIAL OF THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS 
The defendants have made absolutely no attempt to offer 
any plausible justification for the gender based discrimination 
in Utah's statute which requires unwed fathers to file a document 
to protect their parental rights but places no such requirement 
on unwed mothers. They refer generally to the history of the 
common law's refusal to recognize paternal rights in illegitimate 
children, but the reference is pointless because the United 
States Supreme Court has expressly repudiated the notion that 
unwed fathers have no constitutionally protected interest in 
their children. Stanley v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The 
fact of the matter is that whether the defendants approve or not, 
the "day is gone when the putative father has no parental rights 
under the law." State ex rel. Wingard, 223 Kan. 661, 665, 576 
P.2d 620, 624 (1978). 
- 9 -
Equally pointless is the defendants1 reference to the 
common law presumption that mothers are better custodians of 
young children than fathers. The defendants suggest that this 
presumption retains its vitality, but this assertion is absolute-
ly false. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that 
such a presumption is inconsistent with the equal protection 
guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. Pusey v. 
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). The Court noted that the 
presumption was not only unconstitutional, it was wrong. 
Even ignoring the constitutional infir-
mities of the maternal preference, the rule 
lacks validity because it is unnecessary and 
perpetuates outdated stereotypes. 
728 P.2d at 120. 
Not surprisingly, and despite the defendants1 sugges-
tion to the contrary, every recent decision which addresses the 
old presumption of custody in the mother, in cases involving 
children born to unwed parents, rejects the viability of that 
presumption. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Martin, 
252 Pa.Super. 118, 381 A.2d 173 (Pa.App. 1977); Brazemore v. 
Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C.App. 1978); Brauch v. Shaw, 121 N.H. 
562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981); Heyer v. Peterson, 307 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 
1981); Smith v. Watson, 425 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1983); Matter of 
Custody of Bourey, 127 Ill.App.3d 530, 469 N.E.2d 386 (Ill.App. 
1984). 
The defendants simply cannot accept the notion that mer 
and women can be similarly situated in their relationship with 
their child even though they don't share the same sex. In fact, 
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their whole argument is premised on the foundation that the "two 
parents of an illegitimate child are not similarly situated." 
The only argument they advance in support of this proposition, 
however, is the outdated stereotype of the common law which has 
been uniformly rejected. 
In declaring its state's adoption statute unconstitu-
tional because of its discrimination in favor of unwed mothers 
and against unwed fathers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted 
that the only difference between unwec^  mothers and fathers is 
their sex. Any differing statutory treatment of such parents is, 
therefore, an unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of sex. 
The only differences between unwed fathers 
and unwed mothers are those based on sex. 
This is an impermissible basis for denying 
unwed fathers rights [under the statute]. 
Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1976). 
As a matter of federal constitutional law, the United 
States Supreme Court has noted that any statutory discrimination, 
based solely on the sex of the parent and not on the nature of 
his or her relationship with the child, is a violation of equal 
protection because any 
undifferentiated distinction between unwed 
mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all 
circumstances where a child of theirs is at 
issue, does not bear a substantial relation-
ship to the State's asserted interests. 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). 
The undifferentiated distinction in Utah's, statute 
bears no substantial relationship to any asserted state interest 
because no matter how compelling the state's interest in speedily 
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identifying willing parents for newborn illegitimate children, 
every argument in favor of requiring fathers to promptly register 
also applies to mothers. For example, the defendants acknowledge 
that Mr. Swaynefs identity and location were known but they 
assert that he can be required to file because "his legal commit-
ment to the child was not [known]." Neither was the mother's. 
Why isnft she required to file? Because she is a woman. 
In an effort to avoid having to identify some 
compelling reason which justifies this invidious discrimination, 
defendants seek instead to suggest that the issue has already 
been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. The assertion 
that the facts of this case are "very similar" to the facts of 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), is intellectually 
dishonest. The statute being considered in Lehr provided for 
several ways in which a father could preserve his rights, two of 
which would offer protection to Mr. Swayne. He filed his notice 
of paternity prior to any adoption of his child and the mother 
signed a sworn statement of his paternity prior to any adoption 
of the child. 463 U.S. at 251. Mr. Lehr's child was more than 
two years old when his rights were terminated; Mr. Swaynefs less 
than a week. Mr. Lehr's child was adopted by her stepfather; Mr. 
Swaynefs child was given to strangers. Perhaps most telling is 
the fact that the Court in Lehr expressly held that "these 
statutes may not be constitutionally applied in that class of 
cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated 
with regard to their relationship with the child." 463 U.S. at 
267. 
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Of course, the defendants simply reject the notion that 
men and women can be similarly situated in their relationship 
with the child because they don't shaife the same sex. Obviously, 
the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
both repudiated this outdated sexual prejudice. 
In addition to the equal protection provision embodied 
in the Utah Constitution in Art. 1 §24, Utah's Constitution also 
requires that men and women enjoy equally ffall civil, political 
and religious rights and privileges.ff Constitution of Utah, 
Article IV §1. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3) (Rep. Vol. 9 
1987) women are accorded the absolute right to consent before 
their illegitimate children can be adopted. Men do not share 
this right. The statute differentiates between men and women in 
relation to parental rights, which rights are "fundamental to our 
society.ff In Re J.P. , 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982). 
No amount of sophistry can excuse this blatant viola-
tion of the equal protection principles set forth in the Consti-
tution. The statute is manifestly unconstitutional. 
The defendants' continual reference to an unwed fa-
ther's "provisional" paternal rights, which are subject to 
forfeiture if he does not come forward, provides no justification 
for termination of Mr. Swayne's rights. How much earlier can a 
father begin establishing his relationship with his child than 
Mr. Swayne did when he was present for her birth? 
Mr. Swayne "came forward" immediately. The problem, of 
course, is that the statute requires nim to come forward in a 
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different way. However, because it placed no such requirement on 
Ms. Paxman it cannot be constitutionally applied to the facts of 
this case. 
POINT III APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN 
QUESTION WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
In his initial brief, plaintiff argued that the conclu-
sive presumption of abandonment contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§78-30-4(3)(c) (Rep. Vol. 9 1987), would be violative of due 
process if applied to him because all the evidence demonstrates 
that he clearly did not abandon his little girl. The defendant 
simply chose not to respond to this argument. The question 
remains, therefore, in what way did Mr. Swayne abandon his 
interest in his child? The only answer is that he didn't comply 
with the statute. If a statute mandates a finding which is 
inconsistent with what a factual inquiry may reveal, then the 
statute violates due process. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 
(1973); Lafleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632 
(1974). 
POINT IV THE STATUTE IN QUESTION VIOLATES 
UTAH'S OPEN COURT PROVISION 
The defendants1 response to the assertion that the 
statute violates Art. 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution is truly 
quite strange. They assert that because he is in Court, plain-
tiff hasn't been denied access to the Courts. 
The statute expressly provides that Mr. Swayne is 
"barred from . . . bringing or maintaining any action to estab-
lish his paternity of the child.ff By saying that the Courts hav< 
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never enforced the provision the defendants implicitly acknowl-
edge that it is unenforceable because it is unconstitutional. 
The Courts cannot be closed to the assertion of fundamental, 
constitutionally protected rights. A statute which purports to 
do so violates Art. 1 §11. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the course of this case the plaintiff has 
repeatedly posed two questions of constitutional significance. 
Why does an unwed father have to file and not an unwed mother? 
In what way did Mr. Swayne demonstrate an intent to abandon his 
opportunity interest in his parental rights in relation to his 
daughter? Neither has been answered satisfactorily by the 
defendants. 
The answer that mothers are presumed to be fit and 
loving and fathers aren't has been rejected as inconsistent with 
equal protection principle. The answer that the statute 
irrebuttably presumes abandonment is inconsistent with due 
process principles. 
The appropriate resolution of this action is manifest. 
In an attempt to persuade this Court tfc> adopt a position not 
supported by the law, defendants imply that Mr. Swayne is person-
ally incapable of being a caring father and suggest to the Court 
that adherence to the Constitution wilfL have "serious detrimental 
impact" on Mr. Swayne's child. (Respondents1 brief at 29 n. 10). 
Mr. Swayne is fit to be a father but Utah law gives him 
no forum in which to prove it. Mr. Swayne1s child would be 
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benefited by knowing her father and her natural family, by 
looking into the faces of her human history, but Utah law pro-
vides no forum in which to prove it- Mr. Swayne wants to take 
his opportunity to care and provide for his daughter, but Utah's 
statutory law prohibits it. The Utah law is unconstitutional and 
its detrimental impact on the lives of parents and children will 
continue until it is declared to be so. 
DATED this day of June, 1988. 
M. David Eckersley 
Billy L. Walker, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were delivered this day of June, 1988, to 
David M. McConkie, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 330 South 300 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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Liberal, Kansas. Thus, in order to keep 
presentation of evidence to the jury run-
ning smoothly, it would be more expedi-
tious to try the case in Topeka. The court 
notes that the defendants represent that 
Fred Phelps, plaintiffs counsel, has agreed 
that the case should be tried in Topeka. 
The court therefore finds that defendants' 
Bunnell and Arheart's motion to transfer 
the trial setting to Topeka is hereby grant-
ed. 
IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE 
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for re-
consideration of the Court's Memorandum 
and Order filed April 8, 1987, which grant-
ed summary judgment to defendant Duck-
worth on the grounds of judicial immunity 
is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER OR-
DERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to 
file a second amendment to her complaint 
is granted in part. Plaintiff shall have 
leave to file a second amendment to name 
the State of Kansas as a party defendant. 
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second 
amendment to the complaint which names 
Keaton G. Duckworth as a defendant is 
hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER OR-
DERED that the defendants Bunnell and 
Arheart's motion to transfer the trial set-
ting to Topeka is hereby granted. 
DATED: This 26th day of June, 1987, at 
Kansas City, Kansas. 
| KIYNUHBIR SYSTEM, £ 
Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe, 
Jane Doe and Leslie Doe, in his or her 
official capacity as a District Court 
Judge of the Third District Court of the 
State of Utah, Defendants. 
Civ. No. 87-C-Q591G. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, CD. 
Sept 3, 1987. 
Putative father of infant brought ac-
tion pursuant to § 1983 in which he at-
SOCIAL SERVICES 1537 
1537 (D.Utah 1987) 
tempted to gain right of custody, care and 
control of newborn child who had been 
surrendered by mother to private adoption 
agency. On motion to dismiss by adoption 
agency and prospective adoptive parents, 
and putative father's motion for prelimi-
nary injunction, the District Court, J. 
Thomas Greene, J., held that: (1) private 
adoption agency and prospective adoptive 
parents were "state actors" through uti-
lization of adoption statute for purposes of 
father's § 1983 action; (2) proper persons 
were named as parties; and (3) abstention 
by federal court was required. 
Motion to dismiss granted. 
1. Civil Rights <s=>13.5(4) 
Invocation of state statute, which re-
quired that any time custody of illegitimate 
child is relinquished by mother, father's 
parental rights will be automatically cut off 
unless notice of paternity previously has 
been filed by biological father, by private 
individual such as adoption agency or attor-
ney constitutes state action for purposes of 
§ 1983 civil rights action brought by bio-
logical father for purposes of regaining 
custody of infant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
2. Civil Rights <5=>13.11 
In § 1983 action by putative father for 
determination of his parental rights, which 
challenged operation of statute which pro-
vided that father of illegitimate child con-
clusively is presumed to have abandoned 
child if he fails to file claim of paternity 
and notice of willingness to support child 
prior to time child is placed by mother with 
licensed adoption agency, father was only 
required to name as parties child's mother 
who relinquished all custody and control of 
child, adoption agency, and prospective 
adoptive parents. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
3. Federal Courts <3=>48 
Federal court abstained from render-
ing decision in putative father's challenge 
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to termination of his parental rights by 
operation of state adoption statute, though 
he named proper parties in § 1983 action; 
father may be able to establish that as 
applied, state statute was violative of 
greater protections of State Constitution, 
thereby mooting federal constitutional 
question and case presented important 
questions of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4. 
M. David Eckersley, Billy L. Walker, Jr., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff. 
David M. McConkie, B. Lloyd Poelman, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
J. THOMAS GREENE, District 
Judge. 
This matter came on for hearing on July 
27, 1987 on defendants1 motion to dismiss 
and plaintiffs motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Defendants were represented by 
David M. McConkie and B. Lloyd Poelman 
and plaintiff was represented by M. David 
Eckersley and Billy L. Walker, Jr. Plain-
tiff and defendants submitted memoran-
dums of law and a stipulated statement of 
facts and the court heard oral argument, 
after which the matters were taken under 
advisement. The court is now fully ad-
vised and sets forth its Memorandum Deci-
sion and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
This suit is brought by plaintiff against 
L.D.S. Social Services, a non-profit private 
adoption agency affiliated with the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; John 
Doe and Jane Doe, who are prospective 
adoptive parents of the newborn child of 
which plaintiff is the biological father; and 
Leslie Doe, who is asserted to be a District 
Court Judge of the Third District Court of 
Utah who plaintiff believes has presently 
before him or her a petition for adoption. 
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and requests that this court declare 
that he has the right of custody, care and 
control of the newborn child, that the provi-
sions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1984) 
be declared violative of the United States 
Constitution, that Judge Doe be enjoined 
from entering any Decree of Adoption 
without plaintiffs consent, and that dam-
ages be awarded as against defendant 
L.D.S. Social Services. The immediate mat-
ter of a preliminary injunction involves a 
request by plaintiff that he be granted 
custody and that defendant L.D.S. Social 
Services be enjoined from continuing to 
exercise custody over the child. 
Plaintiff ^nd defendants have filed a 
statement containing the following stipu-
lated facts: I 
1. Stevfen Swayne is the natural fa-
ther of a lj)aby girl born out of wedlock 
on June 4, 1987. 
2. Penny Paxman is the mother of 
the child. 
3. Both Steven Swayne and Penny 
Paxman aite life-long residents of the 
State of Utah and resided in the State of 
Utah at all times pertinent to the facts 
and circumstances in this matter. 
4. Steven Swayne first learned that 
Penny Paxman was pregnant in October, 
1986. 
5. Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
are not now married nor have they ever 
been married At no time during Penny 
Paxman's pregnancy or prior to the relin-
quishment of the child to L.D.S. Social 
Services did Steven Swayne offer to mar-
ry Penny Pajxman or offer to financially 
support Pemjiy Paxman. 
6. At no time during the pregnancy 
or prior to the relinquishment of the child 
did Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
have any plar^  or intention to live togeth-
er in a family unit. 
7. Steven Swayne was present in the 
hospital when! the child was born on June 
4, 1987, and visited the child and Penny 
Paxman while they were in the hospital. 
While in the ^ospital, Mr. Swfayne was 
told that it wak necessary for him to sign 
a document in order to have his name 
placed on the child's birth certificate. 
Mr. Swayne djd not sign the necessary 
document or acknowledgment of paterni-
ty before the Child was discharged from 
the ho: 
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the hospital or before the child was relin-
quished to L.D.S. Social Services and 
therefore his name does not appear on 
the child's birth certificate. 
8. Penny Paxman's mother dis-
charged Penny and the baby from the 
hospital on June 6, 1987, and made finan-
cial arrangements for hospital expenses. 
Mr. Swayne has not paid any of the 
hospital expenses or paid any of the ex-
penses for the baby's support. 
9. Prior to the pregnancy and during 
the course of the pregnancy, Penny Pax-
man resided with her parents. After be-
ing released from the hospital, Penny 
Paxman and her child returned to her 
parent's home. 
10. Steven Swayne offered to make 
arrangements for Penny Paxman to 
move in with his mother. However, Pen-
ny Paxman would have provided her own 
living expenses. 
11. Penny Paxman signed an affida-
vit releasing the child to L.D.S. Social 
Services on June 8, 1987, and physically 
surrendered custody of the child the next 
day. 
12. Steven Swayne did not register 
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics in 
the Department of Health a notice of his 
claim of paternity of an illegitimate child 
and of his willingness and intent to sup-
port the child to the best of his ability 
prior to the date the illegitimate child 
was relinquished or placed with L.D.S. 
•Social Services for adoption. 
13. Steven Swayne filed his acknowl-
edgment of paternity on June 15, 1987, 
which was the first working day after he 
learned that the child had been placed for 
adoption. 
14. During the course of the pregnan-
cy, Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman 
discussed the fact that Penny Paxman's 
parents wanted her to place the baby for 
adoption. Penny Paxman did not inform 
Mr. Swayne that she did or did not intend 
to surrender the child for adoption. 
15. L.D.S. Social Services placed the 
child for adoption with an adoptive fami-
ly on June 12, 1987, in conformity with 
the requirements of Utah statutes. 
SOCIAL SERVICES 1539 
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16. In the event Steven Swayne is 
granted custody of the child, Mr. Swayne 
intends to place the child under the pri-
mary care of members of his family until 
such time as he can become more stable. 
17. On June 15, 1987, Steven Swayne 
and Penny Paxman requested an amend-
ment to the birth certificate of the child 
naming Steven Swayne as the father of 
the child. 
18. During the course of the pregnan-
cy and thereafter Mr. Swayne told his 
family and others that he was the father 
of the child. 
19. Penny Paxman took the baby to 
Steven Swayne's apartment for a short 
visit once before the relinquishment to 
L.D.S. Social Services and once after the 
relinquishment. 
- 20. Mr. Swayne was unaware of his 
duty to file an acknowledgment of pater-
nity and willingness to support the child 
until after the child had been released by 
the mother for adoption. 
21. On June 15, 1987, both Mr. 
Swayne and Penny Paxman appeared at 
the offices of L.D.S. Social Services and 
asked that custody be given to Mr. 
Swayne. 
22. L.D.S. Social Services has testi-
fied that at the time of the relinquish-
ment of the child to L.D.S. Social Servic-
es Penny Paxman did not disclose the 
identity of Steven Swayne and advised 
L.D.S. Social Services that he would not 
take responsibility for the child and that 
she did not want L.D.S. Social Services to 
contact him. 
23. On February 9, 1986, Steven 
Swayne consented to the adoptive place-
ment of another illegitimate child by a 
different woman. L.D.S. Social Services 
requested and obtained his consent. 
Defendant L.D.S. Social Sendees urges 
this court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure to 
allege "state action/' and on the further 
ground that this court should abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction in favor of resolu-
tion by the state courts of Utah. The 
defendants also urge dismissal of plain-
tiffs motion for preliminary injunction pri-
1540 670 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
marily because of lack of substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
I. State Action 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution provides in part: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." (emphasis added). The protections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment thus apply 
only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property is by governmental "state action" 
rather by than purely private action. The 
fundamental policies of the state action 
principle are to preserve an area of individ-
1. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922, 
936-37, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 
(1982); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250, 
83 S.Ct. 1119, 1133, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963) (Har-
lan, J., concurring and dissenting); Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 25, 27 L.Ed. 835 
(1883); see generally L. Tribe, American Consti-
tutional Law, § 18-2 at 1149 (1978). 
2. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 
1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) the Court recog-
nized the weighty "liberty" interest of one father 
of illegitimate children in maintaining custody 
of those children with whom he had a fully 
developed parental relationship: 
The private interest here, that of a man in the 
children he has sired and raised, undeniably 
warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain 
that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children *'come[s] to this Court with a 
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is 
made to liberties which derive merely from 
shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v. 
Cooper [336 U.S. 77. 69 S.Ct. 448. 93 L.Ed. 513 
(1949)] The Court has frequently em-
phasized the importance of the family. The 
rights to conceive and to raise one's children 
have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Ne-
braska [262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 
1042 (1923) ] . . . "basic civil rights of man," 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 
1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)] . . . and "[r]ights 
far more precious . . . than property rights," 
May v. Anderson [345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 
97 L.Ed. 1221 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ] . . . . "It is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include prepa-
ration for obligations the state can neither 
f1
ual freedom to make choices without the 
constraints of the Constitution's prohibi-
tions, to further the policy of federalism by 
reserving tx^  the state discretion to deal 
with perceived private wrongs without the 
constraints of supreme federal law, and to 
further the policy of separation of powers 
by limiting the wrongs redressable by the 
federal judiciary absent congressional en-
actment granting such authority.1 
The "liberty" interest asserted by plain-
tiff in this c|ase involves termination of all 
parental rights in connection with his new-
born child, including visitation and custodi-
al rights. Without delving deeply into the 
merits, this court recognizes that plaintiff 
has asserted a liberty interest that has 
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court 
to be worthy of constitutional protection.2 
supply n^r hinder" Prince v. 
158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 
Massachusetts 
88 L.Ed. 645 [321 U.S. 
(1944) 
Id. at 651, ^2 S.Ct. at 1212. More recently the 
Court distinguished the lesser constitutional in-
terest of a (putative father in the potential to 
develop a future parental relationship with his 
child: 
The difference between the developed parent-
child relationship that was implicated in Stan-
ley and daban [v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
99 S.Ct. lfaO, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ]. and the 
potential relationship involved in Quilloin [v. 
Walcott, ^34 VS. 246. 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 
511 (197$)] and this case, is both clear and 
significant. When an unwed father demon-
strates a full commitment to the responsibili-
ties of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child," Caban, 
. . . his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under 
the Due Process Clause. At that point it may 
be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his 
children... ." But the mere existence of a 
biological link does not merit equivalent con-
stitutional protection The significance of 
the biological connection is that it offers the 
natural father an opportunity that no other 
male possesses to develop a relationship with 
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity 
and accebts some measure of responsibility 
for the child's future, he may enjoy the bless-
ings of th^ parent-child relationship and make 
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's 
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal 
Constitution will not automatically compel a 
State to listen to his opinion of where the 
child's be|st interests lie. 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248. 261-62, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, ^993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (empha-
sis added). Some courts and commentators 
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The statute which plaintiff seeks to chal-
lenge under due process and equal protec-
tion provides that the father of an illegit-
imate child conclusively is presumed to 
have abandoned his child if he fails to file a 
claim of paternity and notice of willingness 
to support the child prior to the time the 
child is placed by the mother with a li-
censed adoption agency, or prior to the 
time a petition is filed by a person with 
whom the mother has placed the child for 
adoption.3 The state action question is 
whether termination of plaintiffs parental 
rights by operation of the above statute 
implicates the actors in a private adoption 
to the extent that they may be considered 
to be state actors for the purpose of testing 
whether plaintiffs parental rights were 
constitutionally terminated. This court is 
persuaded that the statute has such an 
effect. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 
(1982) the Supreme Court delineated a two-
step inquiry in resolving the issue of state 
action: 
First, the deprivation must be caused by 
the exercise of some right or privilege 
created by the State or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by the State or by a 
person for whom the State is respon-
sible Second, the party charged 
with the deprivation must be a person 
have determined that the potential interest rec-
ognized in Lehr may require greater constitu-
tional protection if it is asserted, as in this case, 
at or near the time of birth rather than after a 
significant lapse of time as in Lehr. See In re 
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 
S.E.2d 459 (1987); In re Baby Girl M, 37 Cal.3d 
65, 207 Cal.Rptr. 309, 688 P.2d 918, 924 (1984); 
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of 
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robert-
son, 45 Ohio St.L.Rev. 313, 351-371 (1984). 
That question need not be resolved in analyzing 
state action. It should be noted, however, that 
the liberty interest asserted here is subject to the 
lesser protection of Lehr as an opportunity to 
develop a relationship with the child, rather 
than non-interruption of an existing relation-
ship. 
3. The statute reads in relevant part: 
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of each living parent having rights in 
relation to said child 
(3)(a) A person who is the father or claims to 
be the father of an illegitimate child may 
SOCIAL SERVICES 1541 
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who may fairly be said to be a state 
actor. 
Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. There can 
be no question but that under Utah's statu-
tory scheme the first part of the Lugar 
test is met. "Undoubtedly the State was 
responsible for the statute," Lugar, 457 
U.S. at 938, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. Since the 
first test is met, this court must determine 
whether operation of the statute in this 
case implicates defendants L.D.S. Social 
Services and the prospective adoptive par-
ents to a degree whereby they "may fairly 
be said to be state actorfs]." Id. at 937, 
102 S.Ct. at 2754. 
[1] In focusing on the second determi-
nation, there is a critical distinction in the 
operation of the above statute as compared 
with many other state laws which may be 
invoked by private parties. Here, the stat-
ute involved is self-operative and man-
dates the resultant termination of an ille-
gitimate father's parental rights. The 
State of Utah, not a private party, has 
made an official policy decision that any-
time custody of an illegitimate child is re-
linquished by the mother, the father's pa-
rental rights will be automatically cut off 
unless a notice of paternity previously has 
been filed by the biological father. That 
state decision to terminate the father's pa-
claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the 
child by registering with the registrar of vital 
statistics in the department of health, a notice 
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate 
child and of his willingness and intent to 
support the child to the best of his ability 
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the 
birth of the child but must be registered prior 
to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished 
or placed with an agency licensed to provide 
adoption services or prior to the filing of a 
petition by a person with whom the mother 
has placed the child for adoption 
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file 
and register his notice of claim to paternity 
and his agreement to support the child shall 
be barred from thereafter bringing or main-
taining any action to establish his paternity of 
the child. Such failure shall further constitute 
an abandonment of said child and a waiver 
and surrender of any right to notice of or to a 
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the 
adoption of said child, and the consent of such 
father to the adoption of such child shall not 
be required. 
(Emphasis added.) 
rental rights is implemented through the 
actor or actors who accept the child for 
placement, whether a state entity, a private 
licensed adoption agency, or any other per-
son, for example an attorney. It would be 
a total fiction to allow the state to remove 
itself from its decision to cut off parental 
rights simply because a private party trig-
gers operation of the statute. The only 
fair conclusion is that such a private party 
becomes a "state actor" when his or her 
actions bring the statute into play so as to 
effectuate the pre-determined state deci-
sion to terminate parental rights. 
This is not a case wherein state action 
could be found because the legislation en-
couraged a private decision to discrimi-
nate.4 Also, it is not a case wherein the 
decision of a private party to discriminate 
based upon race or sex amounts to a state 
decision because the private actor has some 
"state" attributes or connection, such as 
state funding or regulation.5 This case is 
also distinguishable from the slippery slope 
of private dispute resolution whereby a pri-
vate party makes necessary use of some 
state procedure and thereafter is chal-
lenged as a "state actor" for having de-
prived a plaintiff of liberty or property 
based upon the state's involvement in cre-
4. Defendants have cited several cases for the 
proposition that when a private party acts pur-
suant to a state law, there is state action only if 
the state law authorizes conduct that was imper-
missible prior to the enactment. For example 
in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 
1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967) the Supreme Court 
determined that an amendment to the Califor-
nia constitution permitting private discrimina-
tion in real estate transactions, which was previ-
ously prohibited by statute, constituted an offi-
cial encouragement to the private decision to 
discriminate, thereby transforming such private 
decisions into state action. However, Reitman, 
and the cases cited by defendants deal with a 
completely different situation than is presented 
here. In those cases the question was whether a 
private decision may be attributed to the State 
because it was encouraged by a state statute. 
Here the statute in question increased rather 
than decreased the rights of putative fathers 
over what was recognized at common law. Ac-
cordingly, that statute would seem to have no 
impact upon determination of the "state actor" 
question. 
5. See Burton w Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856. 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); 
ating such procedure or in failing to create 
other procedures. State action may not be 
present in the categories of cases just men-
tioned because in those cases private par-
ties, rather than the state, made the essen-
tial decision to attempt to deprive a plain-
tiff of his or her liberty or property inter-
est.* 
Another consideration which comes into 
play in determining whether state action is 
present is the distinction between property 
interests and liberty interests. Unlike dis-
putes involving property in which private 
parties may agree to some allocation or 
disposition without any state involvement, 
oftentimes the liberty interest can only be 
severed! by the state. The distinction is 
apparent in child custody-parental right 
cases. Although a private party may de-
prive a parent of physical custody of his 
child, only the state can irrevocably severe 
all parental rights, which rights are recog-
nized 4 s being "far more previous than 
property rights/'7 
This ^ourt considers that under the cir-
cumstances of this case the conduct by 
private I actors amounted to state action. 
This conclusion follows from consideration 
of the evident state mandated decision set 
see abb Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 
2777, 73 LEdJd 534 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohnf 457 VS. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 
418 (1982). 
6. Compare, Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); 
(no s^ate action present) with Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922. 102 S.Ct. 2744, 
73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (state action present). 
7. Santo\sky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 102 
S.Ct. 1?88, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The 
Supreme Court said of the state's power to ter-
minate parental rights: 
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the need for 
multiple citation" that a natural parent's "de-
sire fpr and right to 'the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her chil-
dren*^ * is an interest far more precious than 
any property right . . . when the state initiates 
a parental rights termination proceeding, it 
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental 
liberty interest, but to end it Few forms 
of state action are both so severe and so irre-
versible. 
Id. at 7^8-59, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 (emphasis add-
ed); sek also discussion at footnote 2, supra. 
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forth in the self operative statute, and is 419 U.S. at 352-53, 95 S.Ct. at 454 (empha-
supported by several factually specific sis added). In this case we are dealing 
"tests" of the Supreme Court. Perhaps with a traditional function of, the state, 
most readily applicable is the "public func- This case involves the principle of parens 
tion" test.8 In Jackson v. Metropolitan patriae (parent of the country) whereby 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 the sovereign is under the duty to act as 
L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) the Court dealt with an guardian for those under legal disability, 
individual decision by a privately owned The State of Utah has an exclusive and 
utility company to terminate a plaintiffs traditional duty to assure that a child 
utility service without notice and hearing, whose custody has been released to the 
In Jackson the court stated: state by the natural mother will be placed 
Petitioner next urges that state action is in the care of appropriate substitute par-
present because respondent provides an ents. Although traditionally many private 
essential public service required to be actors and family members voluntarily 
supplied on a reasonably continuous ba- have stepped into parental roles when natu-
sis . . . and hence performs a "public ral parents have suffered a disability, that 
function/' We have, of course, found voluntary conduct was not the result of a 
state action present in the exercise by a legal duty. The State of Utah is the sole 
private entity of powers traditionally ex- party with such duty. In furtherance of 
clusively reserved to the State If that duty the state has undertaken to fulfill 
we were dealing with the exercise by its responsibility by automatic termination 
Metropolitan of somej>ower delegated to of a father's parental rights, which is a 
it by the State which is traditionally prerequisite to any adoption,9 and delega-
associated with sovereignty, such as tion of some of its responsibility to private 
eminent domain, our case would be regulated adoption agencies in finding ap-
quite a different one. propriate substitute parents.10 
8. In Lugar the court commented on its prior 
"tests" for attributing state action to otherwise 
private actors: 
[The] "something more" which would convert 
the private party into a state action might 
vary with the circumstances of the case 
[T]he court has articulated a number of dif-
ferent factors or tests in different contexts: 
e.g., the "public function" test . . . ; the "state 
compulsion" test . . . ; the "nexus" test . . . ; 
and, in the case of prejudgment attachments a 
"joint action test." Whether these different 
tests arc actually different in operation or 
simply different ways of characterizing the 
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts 
the court in such a situation need not be 
resolved here. 
Although this court relics on the public function 
test, that reliance is not to the exclusion of the 
other Supreme Court tests. It is just that within 
these facts the other tests seem to be encom-
passed by the public function test. Neverthe-
less, the extensive regulation of private agencies 
by Family Services also could be considered to 
establish a sufficient "nexus." "State compul-
sion" and/or "joint actions" may also exist in 
that the Utah statute "encourages" and "autho-
rizes" the resultant termination of parental 
rights when the private adoption agency choos-
es to take custody of the child. Also, a symbiot-
ic relationship exists between private agencies 
and the state because as defendants concede the 
private agencies reduce the cost that would nec-
essarily have to be born by the state to place 
children if the private entities were not engaged 
in that function. 
9. See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 
§ 18.1 at 602 (1968) (adoption requires that the 
legal rights and obligations of natural parents 
come to an end before similar rights and obli-
gations can be vested in new adoptive parents). 
10. Under Utah's statutory scheme, Family Ser-
vices statutorily is required to prescribe rules 
and regulations for the manner in which private 
adoptive agencies are organized, financed, and 
administrated. Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-4 
(1986). Specifically, Family Services prescribes 
standards for the employment and performance 
of private adoption agency employees. Family 
Services also writes rules and regulations cover-
ing the general standards of practice, the 
records required to be kept, the use of homes to 
receive and care for children received by the 
agency and "any other matters deemed neces-
sary to assure the competency and suitability of 
child placing agencies to place children." Id. 
Family Services is required to investigate all 
applicants for child placing agency status. 
§ 55-8a-2. In addition, Family Services is also 
granted the authority to conduct investigations 
into agency compliance with its regulations 
once a license has been issued. Finally, the 
statute authorizes Family Services to hold li-
cense revocation or suspension proceedings 
upon notice. § 55-8a-3. 
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The conclusion we reach here that state 
action is present should not create a chillj 
upon actions of private adoption agencies, j 
This court does not rule that all actions and I 
decisions by private adoption agencies will) 
be subject to review under the constitution. | 
Rather this court's holding is limited to the j 
role of LDS Social Services and other pri-! 
vate parties in triggering the state mandat- j 
ed result of § 78-30-4.11 Where as here| 
that role is limited as a conduit for the | 
implementation of prior state decisions and j 
policy seems clear that no liability for 
damage* could attach. ! 
[2] A final question is whether the ab-
sence of the state or some official thereof 
as a named party presents a defect here.! 
We think not. The private parties and the! 
named state judge are the only parties 
from whom requested injunctive reliefj 
could be obtained if the statute were to bej 
declared unconstitutional.12 In focusingj 
upon the conduct that resulted in termi-j 
11. Accordingly, this court makes no finding of] 
state action with regard to plaintiffs claim fori 
damages against LDS Social Services. This; 
court's holding is limited to operation of thej 
statute and the plaintiffs request for return of 
custody. That recognition is consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's dicta in Sanchez v. LD.S.\ 
Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (Utah 
1984) that a decision by L.D.S. Social Services 
not to inform a putative father of his duty under! 
§ 78-30-4 is not state action as well as thej 
dissent in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717| 
P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J. dissent] 
ing) that deception by the mother or other prij 
vate parties as to when a child would be born is| 
not state action. See also In the Matter of Peti\ 
tion of Sieve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942J 
947 (1986) (deception of mother as to child'i 
custody was not state action). 
12. It would be of little benefit to name state 
officers such as the attorney general becausi 
operation of the statute seemingly has no rela-
tionship to the responsibilities of such officials. 
13. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 
681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) (suit against privat^  
nonprofit adoption agency and the child's moth-
er; reference in the editor's case summary to 
the defendant as a ''state adoption agencyH is 
incorrect); Sanchez v. LD.S. Social Services, 
680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) (suit against private 
nonprofit adoption agency); Ellis v. Social Ser-
vices Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 198(() 
(suit against private nonprofit adoption agency 
and the child's mother). See also In re Adoption 
nation of plaintiffs parental rights, only 
three principal actors are involved: (1) the 
child's mother who relinquished all custody 
and control of the child; (2) LDS Social 
Services who received custody of the child, 
took applications from potential adoptive 
parents and delivered custody to the adop-
tive parents; and (3) John and Jane Doe 
who applied for adoption and received cus-
tody of the child from LDS Social Services. 
This court holds that in a judicial proceed-
ing by a putative father for determination 
of his parental rights, the said actors 
should be deemed to be state actors for the 
limited purpose of challenging operation of 
the statute. The Utah Supreme Court ap-
pears to agree and implicitly has recog-
nized that operation of § 78-30-4 involves 
state action in the context of a private 
adoption, even when the state or its offi-
cials are not formally joined as parties.13 
A similar recognition is found in cases from 
other jurisdictions and the United States 
Supreme Court.14 In addition, it is clear 
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) 
(allowing intervention by putative father in 
adoption proceeding to raise constitutionality of 
statute under Federal and State Constitutions); 
In the Matter of K.B.E and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292 
(Utah Ct.App.1987) (same). 
14. See In re Adoption of Martz, 102 Misc.2d 102, 
423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), aff'd, In re Adoption of 
Jessica "XX", 11 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 
(1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 
430 N.E.2d 896 (1981), aff'd, Uhr v. Robertson, 
463 US. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 
(1983). In Lehr the State of New York was 
allowed to intervene as a party but its presence 
seemingly was not a factor in finding that the 
conduct involved state action which could be 
tested in that particular lawsuit. If the state's 
ability to present argument is a factor in deter-
mining whether state action exists in this partic-
ular lawsuit, local rule of practice 6(b) is impor-
tant because the State of Utah has been notified 
of the challenge to the statute here. At this 
point the state has not sought intervention. See 
also In re David Andrew, 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 
N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd. In re David A.C, 43 N.Y.2d 
708, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208, 372 N.E.2d 42 (1977), 
rev'd, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 
S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (appeal from 
adoption proceeding involving father and adop-
tive parents); In re: Application of Randall Wal-
cott for Adoption of Child, Adoption Case No. 
8466, (Ga.Super.Ct. July 12, 1976), aff'd, 238 Ga. 
230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), aff'd, Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549. 54 L.Ed.2d 
511 (1978) (appeal from adoption proceeding 
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that the requirement of state action is the 
same whether a case is brought in federal 
or state court.15 We conclude that plaintiff 
has named the proper parties to test the 
constitutionality of the alleged "state" dep-
rivation. 
II. Abstention 
Defendants have requested that if this 
court finds jurisdiction to exist, neverthe-
less it should abstain from hearing the case 
and defer to the ongoing state adoption 
proceeding. In Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 41 L.Ed.2d 483 
(1976) the Supreme Court reviewed its prior 
cases and discussed the propriety of ab-
stention. The court said: 
Abstention from the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. 
"The doctrine of abstention, under which 
a District Court may decline to exercise 
or postpone the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion, its an extraordinary and narrow ex-
ception to the duty of a District Court to 
adjudicate a controversy properly before 
it. Abdication of the obligation to decide 
cases can be justified under this doctrine 
only in the exceptional circumstances 
where the order to the parties to repair 
involving father and adoptive parents). In Quil-
lion the state appeared as amicus curiae before 
the Georgia Supreme Court. See also In re the 
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 
S.E.2d 459 (1987). In Eason the putative father 
filed a petition for legitimation of his biological 
child which was objected to by the child's moth-
er, a child placement agency and prospective 
adoptive parents. The Georgia Supreme Court 
reached the federal constitutional question 
raised and said: 
But the relationship here between adopting 
parents and child did not take place in the 
absence of state participation. The adoption 
laws were being pursued through the courts 
and this accounts for the placement of the 
child with the adopting parents. The unwed 
father has a constitutionally protected interest 
which cannot be denied him through state 
action. Only the state can alter its decision to 
prevent the development of a parent-child re-
lationship with adopting parents until the 
unwed father's rights are resolved. Thus wc 
conclude if Scharlach has not abandoned his 
opportunity interest, the standard which must 
be used to determine his right to legitimate 
the child is his fitness as a parent to have 
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to the state court would clearly serve an 
important countervailing interest." . . . 
Our decisions have confined the circum-
stances appropriate for abstention to 
three several categories. 
(a) Abstention is appropriate "in cases 
presenting a federal constitutional issue 
which might be mooted or presented in a 
different posture by a state court deter-
mination of pertinent state law." . . . 
[Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 
S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)] 
(b) Abstention is also appropriate 
where there have been presented diffi-
cult questions of state law bearing on 
policy problems of substantial public im-
pact whose importance transcends the 
result in the case at bar. . . . [Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City ofThibodaux, 
3G0 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 
(1959)] 
(c) Finally; abstention is appropriate 
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or 
a patently invalid state statute, federal 
jurisdiction has been invoked for the pur-
pose of restraining state criminal pro-
ceedings, Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S. 
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)] 
. . . state nuisance proceedings ante-
cedent to a criminal prosecution, which 
custody of the child. If he is fit he must 
prevail. 
The court remanded for a factual determination 
involving the previously joined parties. See also 
In the Matter of the Petition of Steve B.D., 112 
Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986) (proceeding in-
volving the prospective adoptive parents and 
natural father; court reached federal constitu-
tional question). 
15. In Lugar the United States Supreme Court 
safd: 
If a defendant debtor in state-court debt col-
lection proceedings can successfully chal-
lenge, on federal due process grounds, the 
plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures 
authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to 
understand why that same behavior by the 
state-court plaintiff should not provide a 
cause of action under § 1983. If the creditor-
plaintiff violates the debtor-defendant's due 
process rights by seizing his property in ac-
cordance with statutory procedures, there is 
little or no reason to deny to the latter a cause 
of action under the federal statute, § 1983, 
designed to provide judicial redress for just 
such constitutional violations. 
457 U,S. at 934, 102 S.Ct. at 2752. 
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are directed at obtaining the closure of 
places exhibiting obscene films, Huff-
man [v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 
S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) ] . . . or 
collection of state taxes. 
Id. at 813-816, 96 S.Ct at 1244-46. 
[3] After careful consideration, this 
court has determined that it is appropriate 
to exercise discretion by requiring resolu-
tion by the state courts of the questions 
here presented. This court is persuaded 
that this case falls within one or more of 
the exceptions explained in Colorado River 
Water Conservation District as well as 
the longstanding practice of abstention in 
domestic relations matters. 
A. Pullman Abstention 
With regard to the category of absten-
tion involving possible mooting of the fed-
eral constitutional question, the Utah Su-
preme Court's opinion in Wells v. Chil-
dren's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984) is important. In that case the 
Utah court reviewed the Supreme Court's 
opinions in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) 
and in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 
S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The 
court then turned to the Utah Constitution 
and determined that under the Utah Consti-
tution a putative father receives greater 
protection than was granted by the Su-
preme Court in Lehr under the federal 
constitution. Id. 681 P.2d at 206. Based 
upon that recognition plaintiff may be able 
to establish that as applied the Utah stat-
ute is violative of the greater protections of 
the state constitution, thereby mooting the 
federal constitutional question. 
B. Thibodaux Abstention 
This case also presents important ques-
tions of state law that bear upon policy 
issues of considerable importance to the 
State of Utah. The importance of the state 
interests in this case are born out by early 
16. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 
689 (Utah 1986); Wells v. Children's Aid Society 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984); Sanchez 
v. LD.S Social Services. 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 
1984); Ellis v. Social Sennces Dept. of the 
Supreme Court precedent dealing with the 
jurisdiction of federal district courts. In In 
re Burrus, 130 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34 
L.Ed. 500 (18^0) the court said: 
The whole subject of the domestic rela-
tions of husband and wife, parent and 
child, belongs to the laws of the States 
and not to the laws of the United States. 
As to the right to the control and posses-
sion of this (jhild, as it is contested by its 
father and ijts grandfather, it is one in 
regard to w|iich neither the Congress of 
the United States nor any authority of 
the United States has any special juris-
diction. 
Id. at 593-94, 
underpinnings 
ognition is not 
10 S.Ct. at 853. Later au-
thority has recognized that the theoretical 
of such Supreme Court rec-
complete lack of jurisdiction 
but rather strbng policies of federal-state 
comity. See tfuynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 
F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir.1978). Accordingly, 
federal courtsj ordinarily should defer to 
the state counts based upon the state's 
strong interest in domestic relations mat-
ters, the superior expertise of state courts 
in settling such disputes and the possibility 
of incompatible state and federal orders. 
See Fay v. So^th Colonic Central School 
DisL, 802 F.2d|21, 31 (2nd Cir.1986); Peter-
son v. Babbitt 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 
1983); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 
782, 787 (3rd Cir.1972). Based upon the 
above policies,! courts have been reluctant 
to get into ciistody disputes wherein pri-
vate parties contest what is in the best 
interest of a qiild. See Coats v. Woods, 
819 F.2d 236, £37 (9th Cir.1987); Peterson 
v. Babbitt, 708] F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983); 
LaMontagne p. LaMontagne, 394 F.Supp. 
1159, 1160 (DJMass.1975). 
Admittedly this case goes beyond a mere 
private dispute over the best interests of a 
child and goes to the heart of Utah's statu-
tory scheme. Plaintiff correctly points out 
that the Utahj Supreme Court has upheld 
the facial validity of § 78-30-4.16 How-
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 
?2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). Plaintiff here con-
tends that the jmost recent opinion, In re Adop-
tion of Baby Eipy Doe, so significantly alters the 
operation of the statute that it amounts to a 
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ever, the Supreme Court of Utah has de- The final concern prompted by broad fa-
fined an ''impossibility" exception to the cial attacks on state statutes is the 
statute, and there is considerable reason to threat to our federal system of govern-
believe the Utah courts are interpreting ment posed by "the needless obstruction 
§ 78-30-4 in a way that will meet the fed- to the domestic policy of the states by 
era! constitutional questions raised here.17 forestalling state action in construing 
The state's interests at stake here* are and applying its own statutes." 
great, and the Utah courts have evidenced 
a willingness to balance the interests of 
putative fathers in individual cases within State courts are the principal expositors 
the purview of a constitutional statute. of state law. Almost every constitu-
This court considers that the Utah courts tional challenge—and particularly one 
they ought to be given further opportunity as far ranging as that involved in this 
to do so. In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, case—offers the opportunity for nar-
99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) the rowing constructions that might obvi-
Supreme Court recognized as much: ate the constitutional problem and in-
facial attack on the statute. At least one com-
meniaior agrees. See Note, Termination of an 
Unwed Father's Parental Rights, 1987 Utah 
L.Rev. 220, 221. For other commentary on the 
In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe case see L. 
Wardle, The Adoption Conundrum Part I, 1987 
Utah Lawyer Alert No. 4 at 4-8; L. Wardle, The 
Adoption Conundrum Part II, 1987 Utah Lawyer 
Alert No. 5 at 6-9; Note, The Putative Fathers* 
Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing: In 
re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1081. 
17. In Ellis the Utah Supreme Court first defined 
;4n impossibility exception under § 78-30-4. 
he court said that if it was "impossible for the 
father to file the required notice of paternity 
prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his 
own . . . and he came forward within a reason-
able time after the baby's birth, he should be 
deemed to have complied with the statute." 615 
P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). In its most 
recent interpretation of the impossibility excep-
tion the Supreme Court overruled a specific 
finding of fact by the trial court that it was not 
"impossible" for the father to have complied 
with § 78-30-4. In so doing the court engaged 
in a factually specific analysis of the operation 
or" the statute in terms or" fairness to trie particu-
lar father involved. The Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
[TJhe standards enunciated in [our] cases 
were developed in recognition of the need to 
balance the competing interests in this type of 
case; the significant state interest in speedily 
placing infants for adoption and the constitu-
tionally protected rights of putative fathers. 
See Wells, 681 P.2d at 202-03. In all but the 
most exceptional cases, the operation of sec-
tion 78-3-04 achieves that balance as it af-
fords putative fathers the opportunity to as-
sert and protect their rights while providing a 
finite point at which the state's interest super-
cedes that of the father. However, where a 
father docs not know of the need to protect 
his rights, there is no "reasonable opportuni-
ty" to assert or protect parental rights. In 
such a case, the operation of the statute fails 
Jo achieve the desired balance and raises seri-
ous due process concerns. Although we have 
previously established that actual notice is not 
required prior to termination of parental 
rights under section 78-30-4(3), Wells, 681 
P.2d at 207, that determination was based at 
least in part on the assumption that "(n]otice 
requirements may be satisfied when necessar-
ily implied," Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256, n. 16 
(citation omitted), i.e., in the usual case where 
the putative father knows or should know of 
the birth and can reasonably take the timely 
action required to avoid the statutory bar. 
Under the circumstances of this case, how-
ever, including the clearly articulated intent 
of the father to keep and rear the child, the 
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all 
involved, the representations made by the 
rnother, the actions of her family, the prema-
ture birth, and the non-residency of the father 
coupled with his absence at the time of birth, 
we cannot say that this was either a usual 
case or that notice may be implied. We there-
fore conclude that appellant has successfully 
shown "that the termination of his parental 
rights was contrary to basic notions of due 
process, and that he came forward within a 
reasonable time after the baby's birth, [such 
that] he should be deemed to have complied 
with the statute." In re Adoption of Baby Boy 
Doe, 717 P.2d at 691. 
In an even more recent opinion the Utah Court 
of Appeals found a remand unnecessary to de-
termine impossibility where a putative father 
filed a notice of paternity hours after a petition 
for adoption was filed. The court acknowl-
edged that the father failed timely to file in 
accordance with the statute but held that in the 
circumstances application of the statute's bar 
would violate fundamental fairness. In the 
Matter of K.B.E and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292, 296-
97 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The court engaged in a 
balancing analysis apparently independent of a 
determination of impossibility. 
telligently mediate federal constitu-
tional concerns and state interest 
When federal courts disrupt that process 
of mediation while interjecting them-
selves in such disputes, they prevent the 
informed evolution of state policy by 
state tribunals The price exacted in 
terms of comity would only be out-
weighed if state courts were not compe-
tent to adjudicate federal constitutional 
claims—a postulate we have repeatedly 
and emphatically rejected. 
In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is 
whether the state proceedings afford an 
adequate opportunity to raise the consti-
tutional claims and Texas law appears to 
raise no procedural barriers. 
Id. at 430, 99 S.Ct, at 2380-81. 
Under all of the circumstances this court 
is persuaded that under the doctrine of 
Thibodaux it should defer to the state 
courts to allow them to fulfill their duty to 
further Utah's policy in balancing the com-
peting interests in adoption cases consist-
ent with federal constitutional principles. 
C. Younger Abstention 
Under the Younger abstention doctrine a 
federal court will not grant injunctive or 
declaratory relief if the federal plaintiff is 
a party to a state criminal proceeding and 
the party can raise the constitutional issue 
in the state proceeding. Younger has been 
extended by the Supreme Court to civil 
contexts when the state is a party to a civil 
proceeding and the action is in aid of and 
closely related to criminal statutes. See 
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 
18. Some courts do not require that the State be 
a direct party so long as significant state inter-
ests are involved. Under that view the state 
adoption proceeding would seem to meet the 
test. This is an unsettled area of the law, how-
ever. See Ellin v. Robb. 458 U.S. 1112, 102 S.Ct. 
34%, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 {\W7) (White. 3. dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari, joined by Bren-
nan, J. on basis that whether Younger applies to 
a private dispute (in Robb a custody dispute) is 
a question that needs to be finally resolved by 
the Supreme Court). 
19. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 
686 (Utaii 1986), Ellis v. Social Serxnces of the 
60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (involving state stat-
ute authorizing temporary removal of child 
in child abuse context). In this case plain-
tiff seeks) to enjoin the ongoing adoption 
proceeding and thus Younger\s recognized 
policy of noninterference applies. How-
ever, application of Younger to the facts of 
this case would require extension of the 
principle in two respects: (1) here the plain-
tiff in the federal proceeding is not a party 
to the ongoing adoption proceeding; and (2) 
the State pf Utah is not a directly named 
party in the adoption proceeding.18 Ac-
cordingly, this court finds it unnecessary to 
rely on Younger abstention because w 
have founql that Thibodaux abstention here 
applies. I 
Despite nonreliance on Younger, this 
court recqgnizes that for any principle of 
abstention to apply it is necessary that the 
plaintiff have an avenue available in state 
court. Inithis case the statute, § 78-3(M, 
provides that plaintiffs failure to file a 
notice of [paternity prior to the time his 
child was placed with L.D.S. Social Services 
bars him "from thereafter bringing or 
maintaining any action to establish his pa-
ternity of the child/' However, defendants 
point out that through intervention in the 
adoption proceeding or through filing a ha-
beas corpiis petition putative fathers have 
obtained s^ate court review of the constitu-
tionality oi § 78-30-4 as applied to them.15 
The court also notes that ultimate recourse 
to federalj court from an adverse state 
court decision is not cut off.20 In all 
events, this court in finding abstention to 
be appropriate assumes that plaintiff will 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 
PJd 1250l(Utah 1980); In the Matter of K.B.E 
and T.M.R, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
20. If plairitiff challenges § 78-30-4 in stale 
court and t|he court upholds the statute, plaintiff 
will have a right of appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). The 
Court's appellate jurisdiction is nondiscrction 
ary although the Court need not give the case 
plenary review. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 
332. 343-44, 95 S.Ct. 2281. 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 
(1975). 
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Cite as 670 F.Supp. 1549 (S.D.Fla. 1987) 
third-party claim against appraisers, and 
appraisers removed action from state to 
federal district court. Original plaintiffs 
and third-party plaintiffs moved to remand. 
The District Court, Aronovitz, J., held that 
third-party action was improvidently re-
moved. 
have an adequate opportunity for review in 
state court.21 
Based upon the above analysis, plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction is denied 
and defendant's Motion to Dismiss is grant-
ed without prejudice to resolution of the 
matter in the state courts of Utah. This 
Memorandum Decision and Order will suf-
fice as the court's final action on this mo-
tion; no further Order need be prepared by 
counsel. 
(o f KtYNUMB!RSYSTfM> 
CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK, Heri-
tage Savings and Loan Association, 
et al., Plaintiffs, 
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION and Cushman 
and Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. 
a /k /a Cushman and Wakefield Ap-
praisal Division, Defendants. 
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION and Cushman and 
Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. a /k /a 
Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Di-
vision, Third-Party Defendants. 
No. 86-12002-Civ. 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Florida, 
Miami Division. 
April 16, 1987. 
Action was brought against permanent 
financiers for their alleged breach of loan 
purchase agreement. Financiers filed 
21. If after diligent effort by plaintiff, and coop-
eration from the defendants, plaintiff is unable 
to obtain review in the state courts of Utah this 
court will be required to exercise its jurisdic-
Motion granted. 
1. Removal of Cases <e=56 
Under removal statute, third-party 
claim is "separate and independent" from 
claims raised in main action if it is suscepti-
ble of adjudication separate and apart from 
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1441(c). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Removal of Cases <s=56 
Third-party action filed by permanent 
financiers against appraisers allegedly re-
sponsible for financier's breach of loan pur-
chase agreement was improvidently re-
moved to federal district court; financiers' 
third-party claims were not "separate and 
independent" from breach of contract 
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1441(c). 
Alice BJackwell White, Broad and Cassel, 
Maitland, Fla., O.H. Storey, III, Hoover, 
Jacobs & Storey, Little Rock, Ark., Robert 
E. Doyle, Asbell, Hains, Doyle & Pick-
worth, Naples, Fla., for Savers Federal 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 
Leigh E. Dunston, Gunster, Yoakley, 
Criser & Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach, 
Fla., George Vega, Jr., Vega, Brown, Nich-
ols, Stanley & Martin, Naples, Fla., for City 
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 
Leo J. Salvatori, Quarles & Brady, Na-
ples, Fla., Gary R. Battistoni, Drinker, Bid-
die & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for Solamar 
Venture, Ltd. 
tion. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibo-
daux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1058 (1959). 
